Description:
Mediators are reliable parties that can act on behalf of agents that give them the right of play. Unllike mechanism designers, mediators can not design new games, but are designed to lead to desired behaviors in given games.
We introduce a theory of action mediators and show that they significantly enrich the set of situations where we can obtain stability against correlated deviations by coalitions. Moreover, we introduce the study of routing mediators, in which the above mediators may possess information also about the behavior of agents who do not give the mediator the right of play. We study the relationships between the power of different routing mediators in establishing correlated strong equilibrium. We show a natural class of routing mediators that allow to implement fair efficient outcomes as a correlated super-strong equilibrium in a wide class of games. Finally, we introduce the use of mediators in pre-Bayesian games, and apply it in the context of position auctions. If time permits, we will also discuss the connections between mediators and the study of program equilibrium.
Based on joint work with Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, and Ola Rozenfeld.
Speaker(s):
Moshe Tennenholtz, professor, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion
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